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To reject Marx's and Weber's positions-that all causes of social and
legal events are to be found in economic experience or economic and polit-
ical experience-is not to say that the causes of social and legal events can
be fully understood without reference to such experience. Dean Cervera
gives examples of the influence of economic conditions upon the develop-
ment of law and, in turn, law's influence upon economic conditions. He
considers the relations of reciprocal influences between nature and law, as
well as economics and law. Dean Cervera then explores in depth the vari-
ous meanings of "the economy" as a dynamic process, not just as a static
structure. He also addresses the difficulties of intellectual explanation of
economic legal events.
ON THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONING
OF THE LAW*
ALEJO A. DE CERVERA**
It is now common to state that the law depends, at least in part, on
economic relationships and circumstances. The argument follows that
any attempt to explain laws and institutions -as well as any attempt to
intervene deliberatively in the succession of some laws by others- must
take economic circumstances into account. Implicit in this argument is
the idea that the law changes as the economy changes.
The fact that the circulation of such thoughts is commonplace is not
extraordinary. It seems evident, for example, that as diversification of oil
exploitations increases so must the complexity of the sector dedicated to
regulating such exploitations. Similarly, as agriculture improves its
yields or its possibilities, agricultural law becomes correspondingly more
complex.
Nevertheless, it is apparent that neither the verb "to depend" and the
expression "economic circumstances" raise many questions. As to the
first expression, not only is it unclear how we are to interpret this "de-
pendence," but we must also question the degree of that "dependence."
* University of Puerto Rico, January 1978. Translated from Spanish by Margarita Pillado-
Miller and Teresa Summers.
** J.S.D. Columbia University. Dean of the Law School, University of Puerto Rico. Judge of
the First Instance and Examining Magistrate, Spain.
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In fact, it is not enough to affirm this "dependence." Even if the Law
offers opportunities to affect the economic situation, it is because the Law
is in some way derived from the economic situation. On the other hand,
the expression "economic circumstances" is imprecise. We must con-
sider whether "economic circumstances" allows degrees of interpretation
of meaning and the extent to which we will use the expression.
The expression "the law" on the other hand, is a much more precise
way than the previous expression. It can be used with no more introduc-
tion than mentioning that the origin of the law is found in the moment
when individuals within a group become aware of the patterns of behav-
ior within that group, and that certain sequential patterns are imposed on
the individuals who try to avoid such patterns. If we do not establish a
point from which to begin using the expression "the law," we would per-
haps be forced to talk about organizational patterns among the gorillas,
elephants, etc. The behavior of many superior animals reflects certain
patterns which are imposed by force if not observed voluntarily. Some of
these animals may have a beginning of such awareness, but only when
there is a certain level of knowledge is it proper to say that "the law" has
begun.
I. "DIALECTIC MATERIALISM"
Undoubtedly, as a consequence of the above mentioned difficulties
many authors attempted to achieve a more precise conception of the ex-
tent to which the law depends on the economy. These authors have de-
clared that the economy either influences, or directly affects the law.
Alternatively, they claim that the law results from the economy, or that
the economy conditions, determines, or predetermines the law.
The insistence on this high -close to fatal- degree of dependence
corresponds to the so called dialectic materialism, which also uses verbs
such as "to condition" or "to determine" to characterize such a degree.
Dialectic materialism also has made the greatest effort to determine pre-
cisely what factor the law depends upon in order that we might attribute
continuous changes to that factor. In this respect many nuances exist
within dialectic materialism that are reflected in an ever changing no-
menclature. Instead of the expression "the economy" dialectic material-
ism uses terms such as "conditions," "production," "ways of producing
goods," "production relationships," "material conditions," "material or-
der," "life," "social issues," "circumstances," "economic structures,"
"productive forces," "the economic base," etc., alone or in any of their
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multiple combinations. This plurality of names grows even greater when
it is combined with expressions that stress a high degree of dependence
and with expressions synonymous with "change." This is significant if we
realize that such expressions can be used as verbs, nouns, adjectives, etc.
The lack of definition in nomenclature reveals a deeper ambiguity in
attempts to define what the law depends upon. The use of expressions of
differing scopes reveals that if dialectic materialism wants or is forced to
extend the scope of "what the law depends upon," such latitude is bound
to affect the conciseness of its thesis.
The above ambiguity in terminology also reveals that dialectic materi-
alism responds to the necessity for internal boundaries (analagous to de-
veloping stages in the womb) marking the developmental stages of that
factor from which the law is derived. This obviously increases the diffi-
culties involved. Difficulties arise because this ambiguity affects the
number of stages to be observed, the scope of such stages, the manner in
which they are connected, and similar concerns. Certain authors attempt
to define two stages; others three; others four or more stages within the
area of dialectic materialism. Therefore, the number of stages is never
clearly defined, their fluctuation appearing, indeed, rather general.
For instance, after Marx mentions in a certain passage of Das Kapital
"the objects nature offers [man] for his life", he goes on to affirm that
"productivity of labor depends upon a series of natural conditions." But
with those "natural conditions" Marx elaborates on the one hand, the
stage concerning "means of life" (natural resources such as soil fertility,
fishing resources, etc.), and on the other hand, the stage referring to
"means of labor" (natural resources such as waterfalls, navigable rivers,
wood, minerals, coal, etc.). These stages remain inserted in the "condi-
tions," since Marx points out that "in the beginning of civilization the
first kind of natural resource is fundamental and decisive," and that
"when a certain degree of development is achieved, the second kind [of
resources] has primacy." Thus a hierarchy exists within the stages.
Later, when referring to capitalist production as a "given factor" and
adding that "it presupposes man's control over nature", Marx argues
that such a "factor" is not very radical.1
1. MARx, DAS KAPITAL, vol 2. book I, (Madrid: Cenit, 1934) pp. 535, 539-540. Spanish
translation by W. Roces from the German edition published by the Marx-Lenin-Engels Institute,
Moscow.
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II. RECONSIDERATION
Therefore, neither the definition, nor the consistency, nor the reach
and scope of that factor which determines the law appears completely
clear; nor is the level of dependence defined. Is it possible to further de-
fine these matters? Let us begin by using the expression "the economy"
to refer to the set of activities that correspond to a group and seek to
achieve the material necessities of that group. This agreed upon, the ex-
pression is precise enough to start our analysis until we can define it with
greater clarity. With this presupposition we can argue the thesis that the
law depends, at least in part, on the economy.
III. THE RELATION OF RECIPROCAL INFLUENCE
The opposite thesis - that the economy depends, at least in part, on
the law, thus creating a dependence inverse to that discussed above - is
less frequent. However, the economy undoubtedly relies to a certain ex-
tent on the law. For example, for many years the majority of merchant
ships were equipped for passenger transportation. This created the need
for medical services on board; eventually, a law was passed requiring the
presence of a physician in all ships equipped for more than twelve pas-
sengers. As a consequence to this law, ships for more than twelve pas-
sengers ceased to be built. Successful mine production also depends
greatly on appropriate mining legislation. In addition, land credit de-
pends on mortgage legislation. A legal ceiling on gold prices often para-
lyzes gold mining operations. Likewise, successful agricultural
production is affected by the corresponding agrarian law.
The above examples illustrate that a relationship of mutual depen-
dence exists between the law and the economy, at least partially. A mu-
tual relationship, however, does not amount to complete dependence.
For if one depends on the other and the other depends on the one, to the
extent that these dependencies coincide at a certain point (even though
they might follow opposite paths) then neither depends exactly on the
other. It is therefore not possible to sustain the idea that in this particular
relationship there is any fatality or determination, provided we under-
stand "determination" as something fatal. Nor is it proper to classify
such a relationship as "conditioning" in either of the two directions in-
volved, since it is more appropriate to reserve "conditioning" to refer to
dependence. Let us then say that between the law and the economy there
is a relationship of reciprocal influence, in two exactly opposite direc-
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tions, following one and the same relationship. Therefore, to the extent
that there is a coincidence in the areas where these influences take place
nothing less than a partial connection can be said to exist.' Thus, other
relationships can be perceived between the law and other fields outside
the law.
IV. NATURE
Even less frequent is the attempt to leave the circular explanation con-
cerning the above problems. If we explain the law in terms of the econ-
omy or vice versa we have explained nothing; let's not act like the famous
Baron Miinchhausen who tried to get out of the marsh by pulling himself
up by his hair. If we become aware of the need to do away with a circular
explanation it will be necessary to step backwards in the legal and eco-
nomic fields. Perhaps we will encounter certain priorities or determine
simultaneities between those two areas.
Moving backwards into the legal field leads us to phases where its vol-
ume, that is diversification, tends to zero. With just this discovery we
have to exclude the idea that the law is placed at the most radical point in
this sequence of mutual influence. Regardless of the point of retrocession
-even at the zero degree of codification- we always find other circum-
stances which existed before the law or before any kind of activity condu-
cive to the elaboration of the law. Since some of those circumstances
appear to be foreign to economic activity, again relationships involving
the law result, which extend beyond the scope of this investigation.
In turn, our retrocession in the economic area leads us to more simple
economic stages which force us to recognize the existence of something
still untouched prior to any historical moment, and present before the
beginning of an economy. We have reached what is referred to as the
realm of natural circumstances or conditions -to distinguish it from
subsequent moments, no longer untouched nor radically original, for
which we are going to reserve the expression "the economy."
Nature also existed prior to the initiation of legal activity. In fact,
circumstances created by nature, previous to any laws or normative legal
thought, are to be found before the elaboration of any law, at the very
origin of all regulatory activity and law. These circumstances also ex-
2. Although the thesis stating that the economy depends at least in part on the law is less
frequent than the one defending a dependence in the opposite direction, it is often concluded that
"the economic and legal areas are mutually and intimately related." See e.g., MAX WEBER, ECON-
OMY AND SOCIETY, I (Fondo de Cultura Econ mica, 1964) p. 252.
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isted prior to any individual or any group of individuals. For instance,
the lack or availability of oil, the existence of less or more oil fields, the
abundance or shortage of water, the availability and quality of arable
land, the accessibility of minerals, the existence of a sea outlet, the char-
acteristics of the coastal area, etc.
As a consequence, legal codes will show certain traits from the onset.
For instance, the desert areas call for laws pertaining to nomadic peoples;
cold weather will create laws conducive to seeking and storing heat; the
abundance of snow will enforce regulations of its proper disposal, etc.
Thus we can conclude that natural circumstances are at the root of the
subject of this investigation; in other words, such conditions are found to
be previous to legal and economic activities.
V. NATURE AND THE LAW
Once the elaboration of the law begins, an influence originating in legal
activity arises that crosses over to nature. Through this influence the
legal activity may-and in fact does-alter nature, thus creating a se-
quence of natural stages. In fact, certain laws make it possible for deserts
to receive water, for access to coastal areas to be improved, and for the
weather to be controlled to a certain degree. By means of legal measures
we can promote or halt the exploitation of natural resources. Thus, legal
activity reworks nature.
Since these natural conditions necessarily continue to influence legal
developments, two parallel sequences are articulated, to wit: the sequence
of legal stages and the sequence of natural stages. Laws channel our ac-
tivity with respect to nature, influencing it at the same time. In turn, the
natural sequence of stages calls for certain stages in developing the law.
It is, again, a question of reciprocal influence, which has its historical
origin in nature.
Obviously, the natural stages separate from the beginning into as many
substages as relevant natural circumstances exist at any particular mo-
ment. In turn, each substage acts as the starting point of partial se-
quences referring to the substages. This separation continues as other
relevant natural circumstances appear for the first time. Thus we find the
partial stages of agricultural activity, mining activity, iron, gold, etc.,
some of which are more relevant than others. Because all of these sub-
stages influence and are influenced by the rest, the relationship between
natural and legal sequences results from an infinite number of subrela-
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tionships of reciprocal influence, in diversification and in rearrangements
of variable scope.
VI. LOGICAL PRIORITY OF NATURE
In the connection of reciprocal influence between legal and natural
stages, the influence originating in nature maintains a special preemi-
nence. First, any natural subrelation will be halted without remedy as
soon as the originating circumstance disappears. This does not occur if a
subrelationship originates in the law: a mining exploitation will cease
when the mineral is exhausted or when that product loses importance in
the market; on the other hand, the exploitation cannot be realistically
stopped just by passing a law to that effect. Second, the sequence of legal
stages must respect certain limits that nature imposes, such as the abun-
dance or shortage of certain natural resources corresponding to the
group affected by the law.
Another permanent influence of nature on legal activity results pre-
cisely from man's attachment to space and land. Man's attachment to
space and land produces another means by which nature permanently
influences legal activity: as all natural resources are found in limited
quantities, the possibilities for a certain group to regulate these resources
are always limited to a certain degree. Consequently, groups insist on
selecting and limiting for their exclusive use those areas thought to be
more adequate to their needs; the more energetically they pursue this
objective, the more oppresive these limitations seem. Thus, the defense
of such areas from claims by other groups is born. Many animals also
stake out their territories for subsistence and fight for them. As a conse-
quence of this, boundaries are developed that attach certain regulations
to certain areas.
It seems clear, therefore, that nature always maintains a preeminent
position in the relationship of reciprocal influence that exists between the
sequence of legal and natural stages. We can then say that natural cir-
cumstances remain previous to any moment of the relationship through
what we will call a "logical priority." In this manner nature exerts a type
of "natural control" over all stages of the relationship through a ubiqui-
tous demand and incessant survival of nature as the origin. At any histor-
ical moment, the relationship of reciprocal influence that concerns this
study is born again from that particular natural stage, relying also on
certain natural circumstances, to which it is always subordinated.
1987]
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VII. ECONOMIC LAW
The fact that there is a succession of natural stages implies at the same
time that our relationship with nature gradually loses its initial simplic-
ity. This loss is unavoidable. In order to take full advantage of natural
resources man develops mechanisms such as money and other means of
payment, methods of development, manufactured products, the media,
resources for financing projects, machinery, industrial plants, and an
endless number of increasingly complex techniques. The original utiliza-
tion of goods is followed by the utilization of those goods for the acquisi-
tion of other goods; this process is in turn followed by the utilization of
goods to acquire money and then the use of money to purchase other
goods. Later, money is used to acquire titles representative of those
goods. Inevitably, the notion that titles are representative of goods is for-
gotten, which in turn leads to titles being utilized to obtain other titles, as
if the the titles had nothing to do with the original goods (consider the
Stock Exchange, for instance). Even the makeup and skills of the popula-
tion can be affected, resulting in an ever increasing level of industrializa-
tion. Moreover, man loses sight of the original economic subject,
focusing instead on the necessary collective economic subjects of large
entrepreneurial efforts. With all of these developments the specific weight
of manufactured goods begins to predominate.
Now we can begin to understand better the succession of natural
stages; many natural resources begin to have more or less utility or influ-
ence at a certain moment in the relationship of reciprocal influence with
which we are concerned. For instance, the fact that there may be gold
many miles below the surface, is relevant only at the particular moment
when technology for its extraction is made available. The same is true of
the presence of oil at sea. Other resources may lose their influence, such
as was the case with coal extraction when it became possible to extract
oil.
All the above activities are inevitably interposed between law and na-
ture, widening the distance between the two areas. Their relationship of
mutual influence acts like convection currents moving from one area to
the other, increasing in depth and differentiation. Let us consider the
difference between a person occupying and excavating a mine, a person
related to that mine through a purchase, a person who enters such a
relationship through the concession of property, and a person who gains
an interest with the mine through the purchase of stock. All of these
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people expand the relationships of influence, which are now more com-
plex because of the consequent differentiation.
Thus, the expression "the economy" in its most common use appears
to refer to nature as it is influenced by the law, along with that which is
concurrently interposed between nature and the law. We could attempt
from now on to sanction this use of the expression, thinking that in such
an attempt we are achieving the absolute meaning common use postu-
lates but fails to achieve. Despite this, other uses of that expression -
however vague - obscure the relationships we are studying. This obscu-
rity results in conclusions dependent on the meanings, more or less delib-
erately given, to its words. This is why the use of "the economy" has
been and continues to be the source of numerous misunderstandings.
Correspondingly, if the expression "the law" is used differently from the
meaning that has been established, different conclusions will be reached.
For example, conclusions will be different: 1) if we reserve the expres-
sion "the economy" to designate the subsequent phases that originate in
a particular moment in the succession of stages found in the relationship
between law and nature; in such a case to start talking about "the econ-
omy" is equivalent to making a specification within that succession.
Such specification should be used with discretion because the sequence
with which we are concerned is continuous; 2) if the expression "the
economy" is used equally to refer to the exploitation of natural resources
at an imaginary moment, when, because only one individual is present,
the elaboration of the law has not yet begun; 3) if by such an expression
we also mean what we understand as nature.
At this point it should be clear that the last two uses of the expression
have to be rejected. It is crucial to distinguish between what we call na-
ture (with a meaning which is probably acceptable to everyone) and later
developments originating in nature. This failure to distinguish between
nature and later developments of nature would result in misleading con-
clusions. It would also create an obstacle to understanding what is in-
volved in this study. If the considerations made above are correct, those
would in fact be the dangers.
Since it is possible that the elasticity in the use of the expression "the
economy" derives partly from a defective penetration in the areas in-
volved in this study, we could conclude that the law is not just distancing
itself from nature. What actually happens is that the law intervenes in the
economy as an articulated ingredient. Our relationships with natural ele-
ments are inescapably articulated by the law. Without the intervention of
1987]
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the law no occupation dealing with natural resources can exist, let alone
progress. Such development progresses only to the extent to which it is
articulated by the law; the law, in the succession of its stages, makes
possible such a development. The law is constantly inserted into the
economy, without the simultaneous risk of being left on the outside;
somewhat similar to the blueprints of a house that are inserted in it and
outside of it at the same time. Consequently, it is objectionable to talk
about the law as only being situated outside of or facing the economy.
Therefore, if our first attempt to refine our use of the term "the econ-
omy" leads to employing the term to refer to the sequence of our rela-
tionships, direct and indirect, with nature from the point at which the
law articulates these relationships, (i.e., from the moment somebody
utilizes a natural resource thinking of another person - when the exist-
ence of a rule can be postulated the proper way to refer to what is inter-
posed between the law and nature, is to use the expression "economic
law." This seems like the best way to prevent a separation of law and
nature that may force us to forget that nature originates in the law and
vice versa, or that one is unthinkable without the other. Such a separa-
tion would make it difficult for us to see that neither has priority over the
other. In fact, both are therefore equally radical. Besides, the common
use of "the economy" seems to suggest something complex. The initial
affirmations that the law influences the economy and vice versa now be-
come rather prosaic, and the illustrative examples of such an influence
become too undifferentiated.
VIII. SPECIFIC MEANING OF "THE ECONOMY:"
A CONSEQUENT PRIORITY
In the mass of more or less differentiated circumstances that we call
"economic law" it is impossible not to develop stages that group these
circumstances in some manner. To manage such an area we have to es-
tablish limits within the group, separating it in an effort to either define
more stages or to attempt new groupings among them.
Clearly the definition of stages is an inconvenience that leads to the
concept that relations of influence take place within stages, that a certain
number of them are involved in more stages than others, that they are
refracted differently at each particular stage, and that they are endowed
with different kinds of energy according to the original stage or to the
stage from which they have departed. The variations are almost infinite.
The need for defining stages results from the fact that sometimes eco-
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nomic law is relatively close to nature - like the technology for the ex-
traction of minerals - and sometimes economic law is closer to the law,
as in the case of organizing meetings to manage a mining enterprise.
Based on this fact, we have the tendency to reserve the term "economic
law" for activities that are more nature-oriented; the more rigorous the
use the more the activity will be perceived as close to nature. Therefore,
as the economy, using now its second meaning, participates more in na-
ture-related activities, its approximation of such activities increases.
Thus through the preeminence of nature in this area, we can justify,
somewhat, the separation of the law from the economy, enabling us to
claim that the latter carries more weight. This then leads to the conclu-
sion - without denying an influence in the opposite direction - that the
economy has priority over the law.
In law we also notice a stratification that accompanies the law's inter-
vention as an ingredient of the economic law. This stratification implies a
greater separation from the economy (using its second meaning). In ordi-
nances the individual legal subject, a copy of the economic subject, is
relegated in certain cases to a secondary position in favor of the legal
entity (corporation) for which the ordinances provide special considera-
tion. Such is the case for the law of corporations. In this field the opera-
tions dealing with stock activity from a corporation are now so removed
from the economy that the derivational chain has to be explained very
carefully to beginners and investigated by experts.
Let us consider, for example, real rights (Yus in re). The Law considers
the direct relation of utilization of a resource and elaborates Real Prop-
erty rights. To face the needs arising from the utilization of resources the
Law dictates one real right law after another. To protect real rights the
Law institutes the Registry of Property (real-estate record office), thus
elaborating "registered real rights," with a life span within the Registry
that does not have to coincide with its life span outside it. There is a well
known thesis stating that ordinances sometimes establish rights over
other rights.
It is possible that all of the above is more or less conceptualized by the
theses stating that the economy is the basis and the explanation of the
law. The differentiation between "superstructure" and "infrastructure"
probably comes from this argument, since it is a distinction that results
from drawing a single line of separation in the economic law. This dis-
tinction, however, is continually used in a manner that leads to the erro-
neous conclusion that a differentiation in essence exists between the
1987]
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superstructure and infrastructure. This results because no discretion is
used in determining where to draw the line. One may conclude that two
or more lines can be drawn without breaking the continuum of economic
law that begins to manifest itself. The possibility that any number of
lines may be drawn indicates that a continuum does exist. This leads to
the conclusion that a point is reached where drawing a great number of
lines amounts to drawing no lines, since resorting to such differentiation
amounts to making no real differentiation.
Thus, the difficulties in classifying economic law within either the
infra- or superstructure is explained.' If we add synonymous terms that
are used with equal imprecision to the problems that result from this
defective use of the terms "infra-" and "superstructure," it becomes evi-
dent that any conclusions that rely on these terms will be somewhat
unrefined.
IX. THE PRIORITY OF FACTUAL RELATIONS
The priority of the economy over the law (in the specific meaning of
the expression "the economy") carries with it the priority of the factual
relationship over the legal relationship. It seems evident that the priority
of the economy must yield to the fact that the non-legal relationship es-
tablished with nature-the maximum degree of closeness to nature-also
has priority over the legal relation. This priority can be enforced without
seeking support from the economic priority: logically speaking the dig-
ging of a mine must precede any right over the mine's production or over
the mine itself. In general, the use or control of any resource must pre-
cede the legal configuration of the use or control.
The same sequence results from the relation between the real right (]us
in re) and factual relationships with things: the real right influences the
factual relation and is influenced by it; but real rights precede the factual
relation, both at the initial moment and at any moment thereafter.4 The
same applies to any legal relation, which is always preceded by the fac-
3. Since the majority of authors coincide, we can do away with quotations alluding to cases in
which other conflicts are inserted within "the conflict found between productive social forces and
production conditions." The former apparently is included in the superstructure and the latter in
the infrastructure. But a distinct clarification is still far from being made.
4. That the beginning can be found in the factual relation is without doubt alluded to in the
affirmation which states that all transference of a thing by its previous owner "always presupposes
that somewhere in the world a previous relation of ownership has already been established." Adolf
Reinach, Zuir Phdnomenologie des Rechts, DIE APRIORISCHEN GRUNDLAGEN DE BORGERLICHEN
RECHTS, 123 (K ser Verlag, Munich, 1953); (flrst edition published in 1913).
[Vol. 65:785
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss4/13
ECONOMIC CONDITIONING OF THE LAW
tual relation. Legal relationships designed to direct factual relationships
necessarily take these factual relationships into account.
X. DIFFERENCES OF PHASE
The above discussion explains in part certain inadequacies in ordi-
nances. It is inevitable for example, that between the succession of legal
developments and the succession of economic stages (using the second
meaning of the expression "the economy") some break-down will occur.
We often refer to this problem when talking about differences in phase or
lack of synchronicity.
As an example of maladjustments we can quote the regulation given by
the right of option, which does not adequately meet the economic needs
that the code was meant to direct. Anti-monopoly laws always follow
monopolistic conditions. Regulatory problems of conflict of interests
that stem from oil exploitation are still tackled through the framework of
techniques established for real estate relations. For a long time the as-
signee of rights has been classified as an agent (mandatory), which im-
plicitly places his situation, as well as the economic activities involved in
the transfer of rights, within the contract of mandate. Today such a
framework would imply a barrier for this type of economic activity. In
general, such maladjustments translate into an inadequacy on the part of
the law to adequately regulate the economic activities at which the law
was focused.
Taking into account the said differences in phase and the extent to
which the expression "the economy" has been reserved to designate what
is close to nature, we can now say that the law normally lags behind the
economy, and that the economy allows in part for the succession of laws.
In other words, the law's role is to constantly react to constantly chang-
ing economic conditions. Although legislators make an effort to antici-
pate economic sequences, their efforts have to be considered a reaction to
the economy.
XI. THE INTERVENTION OF INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITY
In the above studied relationships the legal activity is only partially
determined. There is no fatality. It is already clear that there is only a
logical priority in favor of nature and of the economy (using its second
meaning). To this we must add that influences, along with those relation-
ships already discussed, intervene in the elaboration of the law. Indeed,
1987]
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the law is also inserted in these "other influences." As if this was not
enough, in the elaboration of law the presence of regularities or law that
preside over intellectual activity must remain evident, and these interfere
constantly with nature and the law.
Considering this interference by intellectual activity, of which we have
seen some examples, it is convenient to make a general comment: the
influence of nature over the sequence of regulatory activity is never di-
rect. The needs or demands from which we proceed to elaborate laws are
just that - needs and demands. Water shortage creates certain attitudes
which in turn are thought of as needs or demands. By the same token,
natural resources are only considered assets when they are thought of as
such. The influence of nature is thus modified by intellectual activity.
Rules are, therefore, not elaborated directly from those resources but in-
directly through thought processes concerning such resources. There
cannot exist necessary sequences: somebody thinks his country does not
offer opportunities and therefore he emigrates; his brother though, thinks
the country does offer opportunities and stays; a third brother may con-
sider the country's lack of opportunities, yet he decides to stay; a fourth
brother emigrates however promising the opportunities in his country
appear to be. The country, however, is still the same.
We cannot then foresee individual attitudes, but as we take into con-
sideration a greater number of individuals the possibility of forecasting
increases. Similarly, we cannot say exactly which houses are going to
burn this year, but we can expect for instance, that approximately five
percent of all houses in the country will burn down. The more individu-
als affected by the prediction that are taken into account, the more pre-
dictable the repercussions of nature-related activities will be; so much so,
that a point is reached where it appears we are facing necessary se-
quences. Yet people can escape the prediction on an individual basis.
From all this we more or less come to know that, depending on the de-
gree of this knowledge, intellectual activity always adds an additional
factor that results in the response to the sequences of nature-related ac-
tivities becoming increasingly more complex.
XII. THE ECONOMIC PREOCCUPATION AND EXPLANATION
Considering the above exceptions, the preoccupation with explaining
legal institutions and regulations from the economic point of view is un-
derstandable. The accuracy of such an attempt will vary in relation to
the institution for which the explanation is offered. Moreover, legal ac-
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tivities concerned with nature-related activities are as removed as other
circumstances that also intervene in the elaboration of the law. This is
why certain institutions find it more satisfactory to resort to the eco-
nomic explanation than to resort to other circumstances or influences.
For example, economic considerations help explain mining rights more
effectively than Family Law. We can argue, then, that natural circum-
stances and the economy contribute to the elaboration of the law in a
manner that allows for the elaboration of specific regulations.
The acquired body of knowledge also aids the successful intervention
in the sequence of those regulations. It explains, for example, that it is
possible to achieve a successful intervention. Through management of
the law we can influence everything else. This is possible through the
continuous rewriting of the law. Also, individuals can profit from such a
process. For example, a paid mortgage credit tax still in the Registry can
be used against the person who paid it, allowing for an interference in a
mining exploitation. Once it is explained that the owner of a small
amount of stock can control a company, a technique for such control is
already provided.
In general, the result of the above knowledge is that big differences of
phase have to be corrected or prevented if we want the Law to reach its
goals satisfactorily. Of course, not every difference in phase requires law
substitution, which would imply the continual substitution of one law by
another without ever arriving at the perfect arrangement, since changes
in activities are usually never-ending. Fortunately, many of these differ-
ences in phase can be obviated through the interpretation of current
regulations.
Other consequences are derived from the idea that the efficiency of a
regulatory activity presupposes a certain adequacy of the economy. For
instance, it is very clear that the importation of laws from other countries
must be preceded by the conviction that those imported laws are relevant
to the economic phase of the importing country. It is equally clear that if
an approximation between the legal systems of two countries is to be
achieved, a certain similarity between their respective economic systems
must first be achieved. Along the same line, any disturbance in the regu-
latory sequence must be retracted if it results from a differences of phase
between the laws and the economic situation. The intensity of the distur-
bance is related to the degree of the differences of phase.
Only by taking into account our acquired knowledge can we attempt
goals with a variable success rate that corresponds to the extent of our
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penetration into the above relationships. A failure to consider such
knowledge could result in very disagreeable consequences. The investiga-
tion mentioned here proceeds in regard to all institutions and regulations,
even if the economic explanation concerning certain institutions or
norms seems to be limited.' To refer to this interpretation we shall utilize
the expression "the economic explanation."
What Noyes calls institutional economics is without doubt the study of
the law from the economic point of view. Noyes adds that it is not a
coincidence that this "method" (as he calls it) did not reach its proper
characteristics until the twentieth century, or that this "method" has not
considered property in particular, "including the contract." Only re-
cently has "the texture of these realities" become truly complex.
It is a concern that touches on what Noyes calls "institutions which
make up the economic organization of society," especially property.
That is, institutions that are involved in today's main social and philo-
sophical battles.
Those who are quick in diagnosing the evils of society, attributing them to
its institutional makeup, and suggesting major intervention, do so despite
their almost complete lack of knowledge on these matters. It is advisable to
understand Institutional Economics as the beginning of an effort to obviate
this deficiency and for such purposes to extend the scope of the science
beyond its classic limits; or perhaps, an effort to consider the same themes
from another and different perspective.
6
XIII. SOME ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS
The economic explanation often has the effect of a cold shower regard-
ing the aspirations of those who believe that the succession of laws is
relevant only to what they might call idealistic considerations or consid-
erations of "pure justice." In the following examples we will apply the
"idealistic" explanation and the economic explanations to the sequence
of laws.
1. Through a number of legal channels women have reached the
center of social tensions. The feminist movement credits itself for this
situation, maintaining that it was their idealism that allowed for the
5. For instance, see Beard's ambitious attempt to explain the Constitution of the United States
from the economic point of view in ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1911). In his numerous lectures and writings Beard has always stressed the impor-
tance of the economy in the elaboration of current U.S. institutions.
6. C. REINOLD NOYES, THE INSTITUTION OF PROPERTY 1 (1936).
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achievement. But the economic explanation sustains that such a success
is related to the succession in economic stages of development. If the
increasing volume of economic activities had not allowed women a place
in the work force, nothing would have changed. But as economic devel-
opments allow for their participation in society, nothing will prevent cor-
responding changes in the law. That is, women have new opportunities
because the economic life requires their participation. As long as the
economic scenario offers no role for women, the female sector will re-
main at home; but when the need arises, the head of the family will en-
courage the incorporation of his female dependents into the work force.
The developing changes, which the short-sighted observer calls "conces-
sions" of rights to women (when men are considered to be granting
them) or "conquest" of those rights (when those changes are perceived as
occurring despite male opposition) are just a continuous succession of
economic phases of development which demand incessant readjustments
of men and women's positions within the group.
2. Obscenity has overcome certain barriers previously established by
the law, or better said, things formerly thought obscene are no longer
categorized as such. Thus, they may be presented in public. Some peo-
ple consider this an achievement of their efforts in favor of the right to
freedom of expression, the pursuit of happiness, etc. But from the eco-
nomic point of view it can be considered a consequence of the risks taken
by some large economic interests seeking new avenues of expansion. In a
snowball effect, the greater their involvement in the exploitation of ob-
scenity, the more forceful the claims to legalize it. So much so, that, in
favor of a certain initial laxness, the claim becomes too great to be sup-
ported by enormous economic investments. Thus, the development of a
new, more permissive legal situation results largely from yielding to eco-
nomic pressures.
3. The abolition of slavery has always been accompanied by voices
claiming credit for such a situation, stating that thanks to altruistic ef-
forts based on principles of human rights, freedom and the like, legisla-
tion abolishing slavery was able to develop. But the economic
explanation insists that slavery eventually disappears because it becomes
economically unprofitable, and, to the extent that slavery results in prof-
its, any efforts tending to abolish it will be useless. As long as there is no
other technology capable of producing goods more economically, slavery
will be inevitable, since the need is for free labor and thus for compulsion
of labor. The Law comes to the aid of this need: to the degree that tech-
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nology evolves, slavery gives way to serfdom, etc. Of course a big differ-
ence exists between the succession in the development of technology -
almost imperceptible because of its continuity - and the succession of
laws that are more spectacular, like those suppressing slavery, serfdom,
etc. The changes in the latter sequence are clearer than those in the for-
mer. Changes in the sequence of norms also frequently take place after
disturbances, in part as a consequence of difficulties in the ability to mea-
sure productivity, in part because slavery is usually related to other
considerations.
4. The quality of life for workers has improved greatly. The Labor
movement claims credit for this since salaries have improved due to its
efforts. But the economic explanation sustains that such an improvement
results from the increase in work productivity, so much so, that without
this increase all efforts to improve salaries would have failed. Given such
an increase in productivity, the movement's efforts are not necessary. It
follows that efforts to increase real salaries are lost to the price increase
unless an increase in the productivity is simultaneously achieved. The
importance of the labor movement fades away except to the extent that it
contributes to an increase in work productivity. Without these condi-
tions the most workers can expect is improvements in the standard of
living for certain groups of workers at the expense of other groups' stan-
dard of living, and this is in no way a general improvement.
5. The increase of all types of government subsidies and the fact that
all governments are competing to promise and give more benefits does
not result from a sudden, general socialization, but from a huge produc-
tion increase. These changes are most permanent in countries experienc-
ing a production boom. What is produced must be consumed and the
more there is to consume, the greater the necessity to develop the buying
power of those who can absorb the excess of sugar, beef, etc. Thus, the
great increase in all types of subsidies does not result from a concern for
certain groups, but from a preoccupation with finding an outlet for excess
production.
6. The credit for the advancement of egalitarian trends is claimed by
many groups, who maintain that those achievements occurred because of
an increased awareness of the equality of the human race. But the eco-
nomic explanation insists that to a large extent it is a consequence of
overcoming shortages: the more dire the shortage the more intense the
fight for the greatest possible participation in production; the smaller the
shortage, the weaker the struggle and the less the inequalities in partici-
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pation in production. Many would argue, perhaps, that the situation
should be the reverse; to that I would respond that the reciprocal cour-
tesy from the passengers of a sinking boat should also be greater.
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